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ABSTRACT
The present study aims at ascertaining whether a relationship exists between the liquidity risk 
and the interest rate risk of credit institutions. By analysing the balance sheet of a small Italian  
bank during the years  2009 and 2010, we outlined its  liquidity  profile,  the variables that 
influenced its dynamics and their effects on the bank’s global management, with particular 
attention to the interest margin and the interest rate risk in the banking book. 
We would like to fill a gap identified in the literature, shedding light on how a set of decisions 
designed mainly to reduce the liquidity risk and comply with the new parameters established 
by the Basel III Framework enables a more effective management of the regulatory capital 
and helps the bank to achieve a solid balance between profitability and solvency.
Our main findings demonstrate that the bank succeeded in modifying its liquidity profile in 
order  to  comply  with  the  incoming  constraints  imposed by the  Basel  III  framework;  the 
actions taken to reduce the liquidity risk also lowered its interest margin, but also enabled the 
bank to  reduce  the  amount  of  capital  absorbed by the  interest  rate  risk,  giving rise  to  a 
globally positive effect.
JEL Classification Numbers: G21; G32; E47; F37
Keywords: Asset and Liability Management; Basel III Framework; Integration of Liquidity 
Risk and Interest Rate Risk; Risk Management
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I. Introduction
Among the reasons for the failure of bank management models, amply highlighted by the 
effects of the economic crisis and partly facilitated by the regulations imposed by the banking 
supervisors,  there is  also the lack of an integrated,  overall  approach to  banking activities 
capable of simultaneously assessing the fallout of any choices made on different risk domains.
An example of this situation comes from the securitisation processes that have often led to 
looser credit risk assessment methods, due to the assumption of a transfer to the market of  
loans and the postponement to a subsequent measurement by the rating agencies. In addition, 
the fact of holding sizable tranches of bonds deriving from these processes, i.e. of investing in 
securities of separate operations, has been discussed much more often in terms of their market 
risk  profile,  neglecting  the  related  credit  risk  although  this  becomes  fundamental  in 
determining the value, for instance, of collateralised debt obligations (CDO) and asset-backed 
securities (ABS). The inclusion of these instruments in the sole trading book represents an 
example of such policies.
Much the same can be said about the liquidity risk. While banks are naturally liable to this 
risk, the availability of an enormous mass of funds, low interest rates, and apparently ever 
more efficient markets have led to its underestimation and to an exposure that has gradually 
grown as  the crisis  has  become more severe  (BCBS 2010).  In  a  period of  an  increasing 
internationalization  of  the  financial  systems  and  a  rising  pressure  of  competition,  every 
intermediary had been obliged to seek a delicate equilibrium between a prudent and balanced 
term  structure  of  the  assets  and  liabilities  while  pursuing  higher  and  higher  levels  of 
profitability. The result has been even very different levels of exposure to the liquidity risk 
(Tarantola 2008).
The  liquidity  risk  not  only  stems from the  traditional  way  in  which  a  commercial  bank 
operates, it  is also a consequence of other risks (credit risk, market risk, reputational risk, 
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strategic risk, etc.). In this latter sense, it is a consequential risk (Neu et al. 2006; CEBS 2008) 
that we must necessarily take into consideration along with the other risks, particularly in 
situations of stress (Strahan 2008; Nikolaou 2009).
There is a particular affinity between the liquidity risk and the interest rate risk in the banking 
book. The liquidity risk depends on the due dates of the single cash flow associated with the 
assets and liabilities, while the interest rate risk depends on their repricing period. The link 
can be seen in one of the main functions of credit institutions, i.e. maturity transformation. 
Banks finance their investments by issuing liabilities with a shorter mean maturity than that of 
their  investments;  the resulting imbalance between the  terms for  the  assets  and liabilities 
means that they take on an interest risk and a liquidity risk (Resti and Sironi 2007). Both of 
these risks thus come to bear on the same balance sheet items, making it essential for the bank 
to take a global, integrated approach to managing its assets and liabilities from the point of 
view both of the maturity periods of the single cash flows and of the interest rates applied.
In particular, decisions designed to improve the bank’s liquidity profile in the short and in the 
medium-to-long  term  can  presumably  facilitate  a  better  balance  between  its  assets  and 
liabilities, and consequently a lower impact of the interest rate risk on its capital. Then it is 
also likely that a lower liquidity risk level may well have potentially negative effects in terms 
of profitability (Resti 2011), but this may be balanced thanks to a lower absorption of capital.
The literature has thoroughly debated both the liquidity risk and the interest rate risk, but for  
the  time  being  there  seems  to  be  no  contribution  from  the  scholars  on  the  integrated 
management of these types of risk. Conversely, among the actions taken by the supervisors 
following the financial crisis, special attention has been paid to the role of risk management,  
one of the responsibilities of which is to ensure that every risk of relevance to the bank is 
correctly identified and effectively managed according to an integrated logic (Bank of Italy 
2012b; EBA 2011).
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The present study proposes to fill the gap identified in the literature, using a case study to 
shed light on how a set of decisions designed mainly to reduce the liquidity risk and comply 
with the new parameters established by the Basel III Framework, despite entailing an initial 
opportunity cost for the bank, enables a more effective management, right from the start, of 
the regulatory capital and helps the bank to achieve a solid balance between profitability and 
solvency. The hypothesis that we aim to verify is that a direct relationship1 exists between 
liquidity risk and interest rate risk in the banking book, such that reducing the exposure to the 
former also induces a reduction in the bank’s exposure to the latter as well. Although this dual 
improvement in the coverage of these risks means a lower profitability in terms of the interest 
margin in the short term, it reinforces the bank’s capital solidity in the medium to longer term, 
enabling it to return to more adequate, sustainable profitability levels.
This  study  is  organized  as  follows:  section  II outlines  the  principal  contributions  in  the 
literature on the topics of liquidity risk and interest rate risk; in section  III we focus on an 
empirical application to a small Italian bank with a view to highlighting the link existing 
between the liquidity risk and the interest rate risk. In section IV we analyse and discuss our 
main  findings;  and  section  V contains  our  conclusions,  emphasizing  the  management 
implications for banks and mentioning potential further research topics.
II. Literature
Literature on the liquidity risk
The topic of the liquidity risk had been attracting the interest  of scholars well  before the 
international  crisis  of  2007  came  about  and,  albeit  without  establishing  specific  capital 
requirements for covering said risk (Resti  and Sironi 2010), the banking supervisors have 
nonetheless emphasized its relevance.
1The relationship investigated does not necessarily implicate a linear function; it refers more in general to a 
situation of dependence.
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The first papers on the liquidity risk date from the 19th century, when Knies (1876, cited in 
Duttweiler 2009) underscored the need for a cash buffer to compensate for negative gaps 
between flows of incoming and outgoing payments in cases where their respective maturity 
periods could not be perfectly controlled. In the 20th century, Saraceno (1942, cited in Mazzei 
1992)  claimed  that  “the  search  (…)  for  the  most  fruitful  combination  of  lending  and 
borrowing operations among all the operations that ensure the bank has the necessary balance 
between income and expenditure, is the core problem of bank management. A bank’s liquidity 
can be defined as its capacity to achieve this balance economically and at all times”.
Among the most recent contributions,  Gualandri  et  al. (2009) start  with the concept  that, 
given the imperfection of the capital  markets, the transfer of resources between economic 
operators necessitates an adequate quantity of financial activities generally accepted as being 
risk-free by the operators who act as intermediaries in the exchanges.  The authors give a 
definition of a bank’s liquidity (“inside liquidity”) as its monetary obligations on demand, in 
the form of deposits in current accounts and credit lines. This definition of liquidity leads to 
that of a bank’s liquidity risk, identified as the difficulty banks may have in promptly and 
economically meeting their monetary obligations deriving from the management of payments 
that are made using bank money. According to Ferrari and Ruozi (2009), the liquidity crisis is 
the result, not the cause of recent bank crises. Their difficulties would originate instead from 
their  having  departed  from  the  proper  principles  of  a  healthy  and  prudent  management 
(already established by international banking methods) and having focused excessively on 
achieving  short-term profits,  combined  with  the  inefficacy  of  the  banks’ internal  control 
systems and, in some countries, also the inadequacy of the banking supervisors’ policies.
A work  by  Cornett  et  al. (2011)  concerns  how  banks  managed  the  liquidity  shock  that 
occurred during the financial crisis of 2007-2009 by adjusting their holdings of cash and other 
liquid assets, as well as how these efforts to weather the storm affected credit availability. In 
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particular, by examining a sample of North American commercial banks, they showed that 
liquidity risk exposure is not only negatively correlated with loan growth in the crisis, but it is 
also positively correlated with the growth in liquid assets, supporting the interpretation that 
efforts to build up balance sheet liquidity displaced funding to support new lending. They also 
show that the market liquidity of bank assets negatively affected their accumulation of liquid 
assets and positively affected their loan growth. By quantifying how much credit would have 
contracted if banks had entered the fall of 2008 less exposed to liquidity risk, these authors 
highlighted  that  new  credit  production,  as  the  sum  of  both  on  balance-sheet  loans  and 
undrawn commitments, fell by about $500 billion in the fourth quarter of 2008; had liquidity 
exposure been in the lower quartile across the whole banking system, their estimates suggest 
that new credit would have fallen by just $87 billion, or almost 90% less than the unadjusted 
figure.
As for the impact of the new rules on liquidity risk management deriving from the Basel III 
agreement (BCBS 2010 and 2011), Resti (2011) makes the point that the introduction of the 
compulsory “liquidity coverage ratio” (LCR) and “net stable funding ratio” (NSFR)2 will have 
a significant impact on the banks’ activity. In particular, the author indicates that the reduction 
in the maturity transformation activities that will derive from applying these ratios is destined 
(given a  positively  sloping  curve  of  “normal”  interest  rates)  to  produce  a  decline  in  the 
revenue, and of the interest margin in particular. Similarly, the “compulsory” holding of a 
consistent  quantity  of  liquid  assets  is  seen  as  being  liable  to  dilute  the  ROA.  A study 
conducted by McKinsey & Company (2010) for the European banking sector comes to the 
same conclusions as Resti, estimating the impact of the new ratios, in terms of the growth of 
the  liquid  assets,  at  approximately  Euro  2  billion  relating  to  the  LCR indicator,  while  it  
estimates a growth in the long-term funding (with a maturity beyond one year) of between 3.5 
and 5.0 billion Euro for the NSFR. Referring to the banks’ profitability, the McKinsey study 
2The criteria for calculating these ratios and the positions associated with them will be discussed in section III.
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gives an estimate of the ROE that takes the effects of the introduction of the two liquidity 
indicators into account: this means a reduction to 4.3% as opposed to a pre-crisis average of 
15%.
Finally, the study by La Ganga and Trevisan (2010) emphasizes how the enforcement of the 
new regulation will strengthen the process of changing company strategies, already partially 
started, returning to businesses more focused on traditional activities (so-called back to basic) 
with a probable downsizing of trading activities. The necessity to extend funding maturities 
and to strengthen its more stable components will give rise to a considerable reduction in the 
banks’ interest margin and an increasing pressure of the competition on the retail funding. 
Including highly liquid assets in the buffer will also give rise to an increase in the opportunity 
costs,  and investments designed to  strengthen the bank’s coverage of its  liquidity risk,  as 
required by the supervisory authorities, have already been and will continue to be numerous. 
The authors make the point that all these costs will unavoidably lead to lower profits, so it is 
hard to imagine a return to the extraordinary levels of profitability for the banking sector seen 
in the past, facilitated by a market that was rewarding extreme financial innovation.
Literature on the interest rate risk in the banking book
The interest rate risk for financial intermediaries, defined as the possibility of fluctuations in  
the market rate producing significant variations in one direction or the other on the balance of 
assets (Zen 2008), has been the object of the supervisory authorities’ attention since 1997, 
when the Basel Committee (BCBS 1997 and 2004) published guidelines on the management 
of this type of risk. These principles, revised in 2004 following the introduction of the Basel II  
agreement (BCBS 2006), do not involve any specific capital requirement concerning the risk 
coming to bear on the banking book. Instead, they emphasize the importance of transparency 
in providing information and they recommend that the supervisory authorities in the single 
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states adhering to the BIS impose a capital supplement for banks carrying a considerable 
interest rate risk on their banking books3.
The literature has amply debated the various types of interest rate risk to which banks are 
exposed (BCBS 2004)4. The main contributions published over the years focus on analysing 
the various approaches used to assess exposure to this risk, generally distinguishable as being 
based on the “current earnings perspective” or the “economic value perspective”. The scholars 
and  the  operators  in  the  sector  alike  consider  these  approaches  complementary,  not 
alternative.  They  can  each  be  distinguished  by  specific  target  variables  and  analytical 
methods.  In  particular,  the  “current  earnings  perspective”  focuses  on  controlling  the 
variability of a bank’s interest margin, and therefore implicitly also of its profitability on a 
short-term time horizon.  The models  that  take this  approach are  based  on the finding of 
mismatching  between  the  maturity  periods  or  first  repricing  events  for  the  lending  and 
borrowing positions within a given period of analysis. The most commonly used analytical 
methods comprise the  so-called  “gap  management”  models,  in  which  the  principal  target 
variable is represented by the operating interest margin (Resti and Sironi 2007). The object of 
the “market value perspective” is to control the effects of variations in the interest rate on the 
global  market  value  of  a  bank’s  financial  assets  and  liabilities.  By  comparison  with  the 
previous approach, the time horizon considered is long because all the dynamics of the cash 
flow generated by each instrument contributing to the bank’s portfolio are taken into account. 
The main target variable is the market value of the bank’s capital, defined as the difference 
between the market value of the interest-generating financial assets and of the positions with a 
positive market value relating to derivatives on interest rates, and the market value of the 
liabilities and of the positions with a negative market value relating to derivatives on interest  
rates. The analytical models most often used in the context of this approach are the so-called 
3 For Italy, see the Bank of Italy (2006).
4 For detailed surveys on sources of interest rate risk, see also (Gualandri 1991); (English 2002); (Fraser et al. 
2002); (Lusignani 2004).
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“financial models”, which rely on techniques originally developed to measure the interest rate 
risk in bond portfolios (Brigo and Mercurio 2007; Staikouras 2006; Grundke 2004). 
Among the most recent contributions, it is also worth mentioning the publication by Drago 
(2006) on the impact of the assessment criteria introduced by the IAS/IFRS - and IAS 39 and 
IFRS 7 in particular - on how banks cover their interest rate risk. The analysis shows that 
standard setters  scarcely take into account  the managerial  context  of bank operability,  by 
supposing,  for  instance,  a  ratio  of  one  to  one  between  hedged  element  and  hedging 
instrument, which implies a hedging activity for each hedged position. On the contrary, the 
actual banking operability assesses the risk management on homogeneous portfolios of assets 
and liabilities. The subsequent introduction, within the IAS 39, of macro-hedging does not 
seem to have solved the problems highlighted, since banks’ hedging target is often the interest 
margin, while the macro-hedging proposal allows only the fair value hedge, not feasible with 
the specified objective.
Memmel (2011) investigated a  sample of 1562 German banks during the period between 
September 2005 and December 2009 with a view to seeking a relation between the systematic 
factor of the exposure to interest rate risk and the shape of the term structure, to clarify what 
factors  determine  banks’  interest  rate  risk  exposure  and  how  profitable  is  their  term 
transformation, ultimately aiming to establish whether banks with a large exposure to interest 
rate risk also achieve a high interest margin. The results showed that the systematic factor of 
the exposure to interest  rate risk (assumed as corresponding to the shape of the past and 
current term structure of interest rates) moves in accordance with the possible earnings from 
term transformation,  but  at  bank  level  bank  specific  and  regulatory  effects  are  far  more 
important.  For  savings  and  cooperative  banks,  in  particular,  earnings  from  term 
transformation are an important source of interest income, and timely changes in earning from 
term transformation strongly affect their interest income. However, in the cross-section, the 
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interest margin is not much determined by the exposure to interest rate risk. Finally, the study 
showed that results  apply especially to the small and medium-sized banks in the German 
savings and cooperative bank sector; in contrast, the large German banks seem to have much 
less exposure to interest rate risk than the savings and cooperative banks.
The studies conducted by Drehmann et al. (2010), and Alessandri and Drehmann (2010) are 
among the first to provide an overall picture of the impact of the interest rate risk and the 
credit risk on banks’ activity. The work by Drehmann et al. proposes a general framework for 
measuring  the  riskiness  of  banks,  which  are  subject  to  correlated interest  rate  and credit 
shocks. The analysis concentrates on the positions belonging to the banking book of a realistic 
hypothetical bank created ad hoc for the case study; these positions are submitted to a stress 
test and the results are judged by two criteria: the first, designed to verify compliance with the 
so-called  “economic  value  condition”,  measures  the  adequacy  of  the  value  of  the  assets 
resulting from the model in relation to the value of the liabilities. Using the hypothesis of 
“perfect foresight”, it attempts to capture how current and future changes due to the stress 
scenario affect the value of all the banks positions instantaneously; it thus gives a long-term 
view of the impact of a credit shock. The second criterion, the so-called “capital adequacy 
condition”,  reflects  current  general  regulatory  approaches.  The  authors  assume  that  the 
banking book is valued using book-value accounting, so the profits and losses are accounted 
for only when they materialise, highlighting the real net cash flows and not the changes in the 
economic value of the balance sheet  items affected.  As a  result,  a  particular trend of the 
profits may lead a bank to become undercapitalised in the short run because of severe losses 
which are expected to be outweighed by future profits.  According to the economic value 
perspective, the bank would still be solvent, but - given the market or supervisory constraints 
- it could have serious difficulty in continuing to operate. Drehmann  et al. also attempt to 
measure  whether  the  bank  in  question  is  sufficiently  well  capitalised  through  time  by 
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projecting the banks’ write-offs, the net interest income, and the capital requirements in a 
consistent fashion. The results show a strong interaction between credit risk and interest rate 
risk, sufficient to influence the net-profitability and the capital adequacy: in particular, the 
magnitude  of  each  risk  component  and  the  speed  with  which  the  profits  return  back  to 
equilibrium  after  the  hypothesized  shocks  depend,  among  other  things,  on  the  repricing 
characteristics of the positions in the banking book and on the cost of financing them.
Starting from the above-described model, Alessandri and Drehmann (2010) develop a model 
of economic capital in which the credit risk and the interest rate risk on the banking book 
interact in a non-linear, dynamic fashion. They show how changes in net interest income can 
be decomposed into two components: the first one captures the impact of changes in the yield 
curve, while the second accounts for the crystallisation of credit risk, which implies a loss of 
interest payments on defaulted loans. Conditionally on the state of the macroeconomy, these 
two sources of income risk seem to be independent. Assuming a one-year horizon, the authors 
apply a model to quantify the economic capital following the supervisors’ recommendations, 
which define it as the amount of capital a bank needs to absorb unexpected losses (BCBS 
2009). The model is implemented on a hypothetical stylized UK bank, comparing the so-
called  “integrated”  economic  capital  (i.e.  the  capital  level  implied  by  a  consistent,  joint 
analysis of credit and interest rate risk) with the so-called “simple” economic capital (the sum 
of capital calculated considering the credit risk and the interest rate risk separately). For all 
the  portfolios  considered,  the  authors  find  that  the  so-called  “simple”  economic  capital 
consistently exceeds the “integrated” economic capital, although the differences depend on 
the structure and on the repricing features of the bank’s portfolio, thus representing an upper 
bound relative to the banks’ overall risk and an adequate measure of the risk underlying a 
bank’s banking book.
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III. Empirical analysis: methodology and framework
The hypothesis of a relationship existing between the liquidity risk and the interest rate risk 
on the banking book is tested by analysing a small Italian bank over a period of two years,  
2009 and 2010. The institution is examined according to its liquidity profile, the variables 
influencing its dynamics, and its impact on the interest rate risk, on the banking book and on 
the global management of the intermediary.
The legal framework for liquidity risk
The new international framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards and monitoring 
(BCBS 2010)  has  established two minimum standards  for  funding liquidity:  the  liquidity 
coverage ratio (LCR), and the net stable funding ratio (NSFR). Both the LCR and the NSFR 
will  be subject  to an observation period and will  include a  review clause to  address  any 
unintended consequences. After an observation period started in 2011, the LCR, including any 
revisions, will be introduced on 1 January 2015. The NSFR, including any revisions, will 
move to a minimum standard by 1 January 20185.
The LCR standard aims to ensure that a bank maintains an adequate level of unencumbered, 
high-quality liquid assets that can be converted into cash to meet its liquidity needs for a 30 
calendar day time horizon, in a significantly severe liquidity stress scenario specified by the 
supervisors. The stock of liquid assets should at least enable the bank to survive until day 30 
of the stress scenario, by which time it is assumed that appropriate corrective action can be 
taken by management and/or supervisors, and/or the bank can be resolved in an orderly way. 
The standard requires that the value of the stock of high-quality liquid assets should at least 
equate to the total net cash outflows (BCBS 2010):
5 The Italian Central Bank has already set some rules for liquidity risk assessment and management. See Bank of 
Italy (2006), 4th update of 13 December 2010.
12
LCR= HQLATotal Net Cash Outflows over the next 30 Calendar Days ⩾1
6    (1).
The numerator of the LCR is the “stock of high-quality liquid assets” (HQLA). In order to 
qualify as HQLA, assets should be liquid in markets during a time of stress and should ideally 
be central bank eligible. Two categories of assets can be included in the stock. The assets to  
be included in each category are those that the bank is holding on the first day of the stress 
period.  “Level  1”  assets  can  be  included without  limit,  while  “Level  2”  assets  can only 
comprise up to 40% of the stock.
The term “total net cash outflows” is defined as the total expected cash outflows minus total 
expected cash inflows in the specified stress scenario for the subsequent 30 calendar days. 
Total  expected  cash  outflows  are  calculated  by  multiplying  the  outstanding  balances  of 
various categories or types of liabilities and off-balance-sheet commitments by the rates at 
which  they  are  expected  to  run  off  or  be  drawn down.  Total  expected  cash  inflows  are 
calculated  by  multiplying  the  outstanding  balances  of  various  categories  of  contractual 
receivables by the rates at which they are expected to flow in under the conditions of the 
scenario up to an aggregate cap of 75% of total expected cash outflows:
Total Net Cash Outflows over the next 30 Calendar Days =
= Outflows−Min {Inflows;75% of Outflows}
    (2)
The NSFR aims to promote more medium- and long-term funding of the assets and activities 
of  banking  organizations.  This  standard  is  designed  to  act  as  a  minimum  enforcement 
mechanism to complement the LCR and reinforce other supervisory efforts  by promoting 
structural changes in the liquidity risk profiles of institutions, moving away from short-term 
6The total net cash outflows for the scenario are to be calculated for 30 calendar days into the future. Banks and 
supervisors are also expected to be aware of any potential mismatches within the 30-day period and ensure that  
sufficient liquid assets are available to meet any cash-flow gaps throughout the period.
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funding mismatches toward more stable, longer-term funding of assets and business activities. 
The NSFR is  defined  as  the  amount  of  stable  funding available  to  the  amount  of  stable 
funding required: it must be greater than 17. 
NSFR=Available Amount of Stable FundingRequired Amount of Stable Funding =
ASF
RSF >1    (3).
“Stable funding” is defined as the portion of those types and amounts of equity and liability 
financing  expected  to  be  reliable  sources  of  funds  over  a  one-year  time  horizon  under 
conditions of extended stress. The amount of such funding required of a specific institution is 
a function of the liquidity characteristics of the various types of assets held, off-balance-sheet 
contingent exposures incurred, and/or activities pursued by the institution.
Both  the  above requirements  influence  a  bank’s capacity  for  maturity  transformation  and 
necessarily implicate a considerable impact on their business model and their profitability.
The legal framework for the interest rate risk on the banking book
Banks have to implement effective rules, processes and instruments for managing the interest 
rate risk from assets other than those allocated to the supervisory trading book. The regulatory 
authorities  (BCBS  2004;  Bank  of  Italy  2006)  provide  methodological  guidelines  for  the 
construction of a simplified system for measuring internal capital to support the interest rate 
risk in the banking book8, consisting of five consecutive steps.
1) Determining “significant currencies”
“Significant  currencies”  are  those  that  account  for  more  than  5% of  the  total  assets  or 
liabilities in the banking book. For the purposes of the methodology for the calculation of 
interest  rate  risk  exposure,  positions  denominated  in  “significant  currencies”  shall  be 
7Supervisors may also use alternative levels of this NSFR as thresholds for potential supervisory action.
8It includes the assets other than those allocated to the supervisory trading book.
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considered currency by currency, while positions not in “non-significant currencies” shall be 
aggregated.
2) Classification of assets and liabilities into time bands
Fixed-rate  assets  and  liabilities  shall  be  slotted  into  14  time  bands  on  the  basis  of  their 
residual maturity. Floating-rate assets and liabilities shall be slotted into different time bands 
on the  basis  of  the time remaining to  the next  repricing date.  Current  account  assets  are 
classified  in  the  “demand”  time  band9,  while  the  sum  of  current  account  liabilities  and 
demand deposits are allocated as follows:
- in the “demand” time band a fixed amount equal to 25% (“non-core” component);
- for the remaining amount (“core component”), in the next eight time bands (from 
“up to  one  month”  to  “4  to  5 years”)  in  proportion  to  the  number  of  months 
contained in them10.
Derivatives  are  allocated  to  the  time  bands  in  accordance  with  the  criteria  for  capital 
requirements in respect of market risks. 
3) Weighting of net exposures within each time band
Within each time band, assets are offset against liabilities to produce a net position. The net  
position of every time band is multiplied by the specified weighting factors. The factors are 
based on a hypothetical interest rate shift11 – 200 basis points throughout the time spectrum - 
and a proxy of the modified duration for each time band12.
9This does not include transactions formally settled as current accounts but regarding other forms of lending 
with specific time profiles (such as advances subject to final payment).
10For example, the band “up to one month” includes 1/60 of the residual amount, and the band “6 months-1  
year” includes 6/60.
11On determining the internal capital under normal conditions, the banks could consider annual interest rate  
changes registered during an observation period of 6 years, and considering alternatively the first percentile 
(downgrade) or the 99th (upgrade). On estimating the internal capital under stress conditions, the hypothetical 
interest rate shifts are determined on the basis of scenarios selected by banks, in addition to the hypothetical  
interest rate shift of ± 200 basis points throughout the time spectrum. In case of downgrade scenarios, banks  
must guarantee the non-negativity  of  the interest  rates.  See Bank of Italy,  Circ.  n.  263/2006, 6 th update,  27 
December 2010.
12The modified duration approximates the sensitivity of the economic value of a position in a time band with 
respect to interest rate shifts for that time band. The Basel Committee specifies that it was calculated assuming 
that all positions in each time band have a yield of 5%.
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4) Sum of weighted exposures of the different time bands
The weighted exposures of the different bands can be summed13. The net weighted exposure 
thus approximates the change in the present value of positions held in a given currency in the 
event of the interest rate shock assumed.
5) Aggregation of exposures in different currencies.
The absolute values of exposures for the individual “significant currencies” and the aggregate 
of “non-significant  currencies” are summed14.  This method gives a value representing the 
change in economic value of the bank for the given interest rate scenario15.
The liquidity framework of the bank analysed 
The  balance  sheet  for  the  year  2009-2010  of  the  bank  involved  in  our  case  study  was 
rearranged to highlight the relevant positions for the calculation of liquidity indicators Basel 
III compliant and sensitive to changes in the interest rates. As company policy, there are not  
included the securities belonging to the trading book, so that the prospect could be considered 
equivalent to the banking book (Table 1). By applying the Basel III rules we then calculate the 
LCR and NSFR indicators.
[Please, insert Table 1 here]
The Basel III compliant calculation of the liquidity indicators generated the following values 
(Table 2):
[Please, insert Table 2 here]
13Accordingly, the long and short exposures of different bands can be fully offset against one another.
14Considering the sum of the absolute values is tantamount to assuming, for regulatory capital purposes, the 
worst combination of positive and negative interest rate shocks for the intermediary.
15The economic value is defined as the present value of the cash flows.
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Between 2009 and 2010, the LCR indicator rose from 0.557 to 1.273 (+71.6 basis points, bp) 
and  the  NSFR  from  0.998  to  1.072  (+7.4  bp);  both  the  indicators  improved  from  one 
operating year to the other, settling at a higher level than the minimum threshold established 
by  the  Basel  Committee.  By  comparison  with  2009,  the  bank  therefore  succeeded  in 
modifying  its  liquidity  profile  to  comply  with  the  liquidity  constraints  imposed  by  the 
supervisors. The differences recorded in the indicators between the two business years show 
that  the  bank  put  more  effort  into  improving  its  liquidity  at  one  month,  and  less  into 
improving it at one year. It is worth noting here that banks (like the Italian banks) that have 
maintained a more traditional activity should meet with fewer difficulties in managing their 
structural liquidity, requiring more extensive measures on their short-term liquidity instead. 
For Italian banks, in particular, having had to comply up until a few years ago with rigid rules 
on maturity transformation, and having continued to follow them (as a control instrument) 
even after they were repealed, could have further reinforced this situation. On the other hand, 
the Anglo-Saxon style banks are more oriented towards an “originate to distribute” (OtD) 
model, and could meet with greater difficulty, under market stressed conditions, in adapting to 
the structural liquidity indicators because of their different business model.
IV. Effects of liquidity risk management on the interest margin and the interest rate risk 
on the banking book
Effects on interest margin
The improvements identified in the bank’s liquidity have a fallout  on its profitability and 
consequently on its capacity to generate positive results. For credit intermediaries, the main 
economic result is given by the interest margin (IM), especially for the smaller banks where, 
according  to  the  Bank  of  Italy  (2012a),  it  accounts  for  approximately  72%  of  the 
intermediation margin, against the 60% of larger banks.
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We consequently investigated how much of the reduction in the IM for the period recorded in 
2010 can be attributed to the action taken on the bank’s liquidity, i.e. we wanted to quantify 
the opportunity cost that it had to sustain to improve its liquidity risk management. Table 3 
shows the interest margin achieved in 2009 and 2010.
[Please, insert Table 3 here]
Although the interest margin was positive in both years, it was lower in 2010 than in 2009 (by 
4.10%). To see how much the decrease in the interest margin derived from the action taken to 
improve the  bank’s liquidity,  we calculated the  amounts of  received and paid interest  by 
multiplying the single mean rates on interest received and interest paid, established for each 
of the bank’s interest-bearing items, by the mass of each of these. This enabled us to see how 
much the interest connected to each item improved or worsened (Table 4).
[Please, insert Table 4 here]
Table 4 shows how, in opposition to the decrease in the interest margin, there was an increase  
of the interest rate spread (given by the difference between the rate for funding and the rate 
for investments), which rose from 2.03% to 2.09%. Considering the amount of the interest, 
there was a drop in the interest paid for each funding item and particularly in the interest on 
the  passive  current  accounts  and  deposits  (-1,482,000  Euro)  and  the  issue  of  bonds  (-
2,300,000 Euro); the interest received also dropped for almost all the investments, with the 
active current accounts and payments under reserve declining by -3,066,000 Euro and the 
interest  deriving  from  mortgages  dropping  by  -1,046,000  Euro,  not  compensated  by  the 
improvements generated by the rise in the interest on loans to banks (+81,000 Euro) and on 
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the  securities  portfolio  (+7000  Euro).  In  general,  the  variation  in  the  amount  of  interest 
generated from one year to the next was due to the movements of two variables, i.e. the mass 
of each item and the related mean interest rate. Of these two variables, the entity of the masses 
involved is endogenous to the bank16, while the rates are exogenous, because they vary with 
the market. The slight rise in the interest rates consequently cannot be attributed to the bank’s 
policies, it is more a matter of the market conditions in 2010. The shrinkage of the interest 
margin  is  therefore  attributable  more  to  dynamics  beyond  the  bank’s  control  than  to  its 
liquidity  management.  To  isolate  the  variation  in  the  interest  margin  due  to  the  bank’s 
liquidity management, we can go back to Table 4 and modify the figures, applying the same 
interest rates for 2009 to the volume of the positions for 2010 (Table 5). 
[Please, insert Table 5 here]
Table 5 shows that keeping the interest rate unchanged gives us a slightly higher loss on the 
interest margin, amounting to Euro -1,016,000. On the funding side, where there were no 
marked differences in the masses involved, the variations in the borrowing rate are not very 
large, but - by comparison with the previous situation (Table 4) - the interest related to the 
current liabilities and deposits increased (335.000 Euro), and so did the rate relating to the 
issue  of  bonds  (351.000  Euro),  and  these  changes  were  only  partially  balanced  by  the 
reduction in the interest generated by the certificates of deposit (-178.000 Euro), achieving a 
global Euro 457,000 increase in the interest paid. On the side of the investments, there is an 
evident reduction in the interest generated by active current accounts and payments under 
reserve (-2,340,000 Euro) and by loans to customers in general, compensated by the increase 
in the interest relating to the securities portfolio (Euro 2,618,000); the reduction in the interest 
16For the bank examined, we assume that all changes on the amount of each item are largely due to the policy  
regime applied for the improvement of liquidity risk profile.
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relating to the “other” items (-508.000 Euro) contributes to the negative overall variation in 
the lending rate, down by Euro 559,000. We could say that the cost of improving the bank’s 
liquidity, in case of unchanged interest rates, corresponds to a reduction in its interest margin 
of Euro 1,016,000, but if we look at the variation in the interest rate between 2009 and 2010, 
we see that all the rates dropped by much the same amount (54 bp for the borrowing rate and 
47 bp for interest received), except for the rate applied to the securities portfolio, which fell 
by  191 bp  (Table  4).  This  variation  cannot  be  attributed,  like  the  other  rates,  to  market 
dynamics outside the bank; the lower return is associated with the safer, more liquid securities 
purchased by the bank to improve its liquidity (given the liquidity-profitability trade-off), so 
in this specific case the bank’s liquidity management also affected its lending rate, because the  
increase in the HQLA “Level 1” securities and the corresponding reduction in the loans to 
customers produced not only a variation in the masses involved, but also a reduction in the 
mean lending rate due to the lower returns on the securities purchased. To understand the real 
effects of the action taken to manage the liquidity risk, we applied the interest rate of the 
securities portfolio “2010” after discounting the mean effect relating to the market dynamics 
(approximately 20 bp), maintaining the same rate as in 2009 for all the other positions (Table 
6).
[Please, insert Table 6 here]
Table 6 shows the real impact of the bank’s liquidity management decisions on the interest 
margin. On the side of the lending rate,  the worsening rates due to reducing the loans to 
customers was so considerable that it could not be compensated by the increase in the interest 
generated by the securities portfolio, leading to a total negative balance of Euro -2,915,000 
that, combined with the interest paid, meant a Euro -3,371,000 shrinkage of the bank’s interest  
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margin. This reduction can be interpreted as the price that the bank was obliged to pay to 
improve its liquidity. Thus, with respect to the Euro -985,000 reduction in the margin initially 
identified in the balance sheet, the impact of its liquidity management action would have been 
three times greater if it had not been mitigated by the general reduction in the interest rate due 
to the particular market conditions.
Effects on the interest rate risk of the banking book
The procedure  established by the supervisory authorities  to  ascertain  the  exposure of  the 
banking book to the interest rate risk was applied to the bank examined here, obtaining the 
results shown in Table 7 for the year 2009, and in Table 8 for 2010. In particular, the 2009 
value of the aggregate positions  (Euro 7,662,000) set  against  the regulatory capital  (Euro 
102,739,000) gives us an indicator of 7.46%, i.e. lower than the critical threshold (20%). This 
indicator substantially expresses the proportion of the capital absorbed by the interest rate 
risk.  In 2010 the amount of regulatory capital absorbed was Euro 6,179,000, which means 
6.11% of the regulatory capital (Euro 101,072,000).
[Please, insert Table 7 here]
[Please, insert Table 8 here]
[Please, insert Table 9 here]
Further analysing the indicator of exposure to the interest rate risk, we see that the reduction 
of the regulatory capital between 2009 and 2010 (-1.6%) would have had a negative effect 
because  it  reduced  the  denominator.  This  effect  was  amply  balanced,  however,  by  the 
improvement in the numerator, which dropped by -19.4%, enabling the global value of the 
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indicator to be reduced from 7.46% to 6.11%. Consequently, the improvement in the bank’s 
liquidity position is accompanied by a reduction of its exposure to the interest rate risk. We 
can therefore  say  that,  although  the  action  on  its  liquidity  generated  a  contraction  of  its 
interest margin, these actions enabled the bank to reduce the amount of capital absorbed by 
the interest rate risk. As shown in Drehmann et al. (2010), we confirm that a correlation exists 
between the two risks analysed that does not necessarily implicate a linear relationship, but 
rather a general dependence.
To further clarify how the bank’s liquidity management influenced the interest rate risk, we 
considered the assets and liabilities, aggregated according to the supervisors’ requirements to 
establish the bank’s interest rate risk exposure in the banking book; for each time band we 
highlighted the changes of corresponding items and the total exposure variation. Furthermore, 
we determined the contribution of each time band position to the total change of the bank’s 
interest rate risk exposure (Table 10).
[Please, insert Table 10 here]
We can  see  from Table  10  that  the  changes  incurred  in  the  bank’s  assets  and  liabilities 
following its adoption of a policy to improve its liquidity also favoured a reduction of the 
exposure to the interest rate risk. 
Among the actions taken by the bank that prompted the improvement of liquidity profile, the 
activities that favoured the increased of the LCR were mostly characterized by the diminution 
of “demand and revocable” liabilities, that produces no effects on the exposure to interest rate 
risk, due to a null  weighting factor for the related time band. The augment of HQLA, in 
particular within the time bands “3 to 6 months” and “6 to 12 months” and as replacement of 
“floating rate  loans”, determined an increase of the exposure to the interest  rate risk that 
22
compensated the decrease associated to the time band “up to 1 month”. Consequently, we can 
highlight that the improvement in the LCR had an almost null effect on the variation of bank’s 
interest rate exposure, as we expected taking into account the weighting factors associated 
with the positions with maturity up to 12 months.
We  identified  the  most  meaningful  contributions  to  the  reduction  of  bank’s  exposure  to 
interest rate risk by analysing the NSFR assessment. In particular, the increase of liabilities 
belonging to  the  time  bands  “1  to  5  years”  determined  the  increase  of  the  indicator,  by 
augmenting the numerator (available amount of stable funding – ASF); on the other hand, 
considering the asset side of the balance sheet, we identified that the strategy of reducing the 
assets  duration,  implemented  by  enlarging  the  position  with  the  shortest  maturity  and 
diminishing those with longest maturity, caused on that time bands the growth of the exposure 
to the interest rate risk. Nonetheless, the diminution of assets belonging to time bands “5 to 
over 20 years”, not only produced a decrease of the required amount of stable funding (RSF, 
the denominator of the NSFR indicator), further improving the long-term liquidity indicator, 
but also affected the most  relevant reduction of the net  exposure to the interest  rate risk, 
counterbalancing the previous augments and determining a comprehensive negative variation 
(-1,483,000 Euro, Table 9). 
The  analysis  thus  shows  that  the  actions  to  improve  the  liquidity  led  to  a  more  limited 
exposure  to  the  interest  rate  risk,  and  the  relationship  identified  is  presumably  generally 
verifiable for the majority of financial intermediaries. It therefore seems feasible to claim that, 
among the consequences of all the actions taken by the bank to improve its liquidity profile, 
there is also a positive effect on the interest rate risk.
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V. Conclusion
The present study aimed to ascertain whether a relationship exists between the liquidity risk 
and the interest rate risk of credit institutions. In particular, by means of analysis of a small  
Italian bank during the years 2009 and 2010, we outlined its liquidity profile, the variables 
that  influenced  its  dynamics  and  their  effect  on  the  bank’s  global  management,  paying 
particular attention to the interest margin and the interest rate risk exposure of the banking 
book. The main findings enabled us to demonstrate that, between 2009 and 2010, the bank 
succeeded in modifying its liquidity profile in order to comply with the incoming constraints 
imposed by the Basel III Framework, and the differences recorded in the indicators between 
the two periods give the impression that the bank put more effort into improving its liquidity 
at  one  month  than  at  one  year.  Given  the  trade-off  between  liquidity  and  profitability, 
improvements in the former are translated into a cost that penalizes the bank’s operating profit 
(Neu et al. 2006). Although the interest margin remained positive in both years, it was lower 
in 2010 than in 2009 (-4.10%, equal to -985,000 Euro). To see how much this reduction was 
attributable to the actions taken to improve the bank’s liquidity profile,  we calculated the 
amounts of interest incomes and expenses for each item, monitoring how they changed. Our 
findings showed that the cost of the policies implemented to improve the liquidity profile, 
without  the  general  reduction  in  the  market  rates  occurring  in  2010,  would  have  been 
-3,371,000 Euro,  almost  3 times higher  than the reduction in the interest  margin actually 
recorded in the balance sheet.
To determine the interest rate risk, we applied the method indicated by the Basel Committee 
to  calculate  the  summary  indicator  of  the  interest  rate  risk  on  the  banking  book.  The 
calculated value of the indicator was below the critical threshold of 20% in both years, and 
dropped from 7.46% in 2009 to 6.11% in 2010. We can therefore say that the action taken by 
the bank to improve its liquidity profile generated a simultaneous reduction in its exposure to 
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the  interest  rate  risk.  In  short,  although the  action  taken to  reduce  its  liquidity  risk  also 
lowered its interest margin, it enabled the bank to reduce the amount of capital absorbed by 
the interest rate risk, giving rise to a globally positive effect.
The analyses conducted so far enable us to say that the costs of implementing a policy of 
liquidity risk reduction could be compensated by lower capital absorption in terms of interest 
rate risk. Moreover, the “flight to liquidity” strategy could be particularly suitable in presence 
of particular trends of the market rates, and may appreciably contribute to improve bank’s 
stability and activity.
Although  these  assessments  relate  to  specific  features  of  the  bank  investigated,  they  are 
applicable  to  the  majority  of  financial  intermediaries,  given  that  their  liquidity  risk  and 
interest rate risk always originate from maturity transformation activities, so any action to 
improve the synchronization of the expiries has a positive effect on both the liquidity risk and 
the interest rate risk. The future developments of our research will aim to amplify the sample 
of banks analysed, and to identify the quantitative relationship between these two types of 
risk, in order to recognize an integrated model for the assessment and management of banking 
risk.
On the whole, our analysis confirms the hypothesis of a link not only between the liquidity 
risk and the other banking risks, and the interest rate risk on the banking book in particular, 
but also with the other main dimensions of a bank’s activities, revealing the need to arrive at 
an integrated risk management in which the control of each of these risks is placed in relation 
to the bank’s different functions and influences its strategic decisions.
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Appendix A








ASSETS 1,061,257 100.0 1,069,658 100.0 0.8
LOANS AND RECEIVABLES WITH BANKS 10,917 1.1 22,653 2.1 107.5
LOANS AND RECEIVABLES WITH CUSTOMERS 909,992 87.7 852,816 79.7 -6.3
- DEMAND AND REVOCABLE 254,551 24.5 209,181 19.6 -17.8
- MORTGAGES (FLOATING RATE) 507,035 48.9 498,667 46.6 -1.7
- MORTGAGES (FIXED RATE) 127,184 12.3 109,253 10.2 -13.8
- BAD LOANS 20,053 1.9 33,995 3.2 69.5
SECURITIES 77,257 7.4 136,764 13.1 77.0
- FLOATING RATE 50,137 4.8 124,727 11.9 148.8
- FIXED RATE 26,070 2.5 10,427 1.0 -60.0
PROPERTIES 23,915 2.3 25,302 2.4 5.8
INSENSITIVE ASSETS 39,176 3.8 32,123 3.0 -0.1
LIABILITIES 955,475 100.0 996,148 100.0 4.3
LIABILITIES TO BANKS 4367 0.5 2573 0.3 -41.1
LIABILITIES TO CUSTOMERS 422,180 44.2 447,480 44.9 6.0
- REPO TO CUSTOMERS 3021 0.3 1993 0.2 -34.0
DEBT-LIKE INSTRUMENTS 495,724 51.9 501,734 50.4 1.2
- INSTRUMENTS (FLOATING RATE) 344,308 36.0 280,956 28.2 -18.4
- INSTRUMENTS (FIXED RATE) 151,416 15.8 220,778 22.2 45.8
INSENSITIVE LIABILITIES 33,204 3.5 44,361 4.5 33.6
DERIVATIVES 13,170 100.0 12,464 100.0 -5.4
Note: (a) and (c) are expressed in thousands of Euro.
Source: own elaboration with balance sheet data.
Table 2: LCR and NSFR (2009-2010)
2009 2010 Δ (bp)
LCR = 0.557 =
77,208










Note: numerators and denominators are expressed in thousands of Euro.
Source: own elaboration with balance sheet data.
Table 3: Interest Margin (IM) 2009-2010
2009 2010 Δ(%)
a) Interest and similar income 41,334 36,227 -12.36
b) Interest and similar expenditure 17,314 13,192 -23.81
IM (a-b) 24,020 23,035 -4.10
Note: in thousands of Euro unless otherwise indicated.
Source: own elaboration with balance sheet data.
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Table 4: Interest Margin (IM) by item (2009-2010)
ITEMS 2009 2010 Δr (%) IT I r (%) IT I Δr ΔIT
a) ASSETS 3.72 977,949 41,334 3.25 978,238 36,227 -0.47 289
LOANS AND RECEIVABLES WITH BANKS 1.08 10,917 118 0.88 22,653 199 -0.20 11,736
DEMAND AND REVOCABLE 5.16 254,551 13,127 4.81 209,181 10,062 -0.35 -45,370
MORTGAGES 3.78 481,885 18,225 3.57 481,189 17,178 -0.21 -696
UNSECURED LOANS 4.65 105,975 4926 4.51 96,709 4360 -0.14 -9266
SECURITIES 4.40 77,257 3399 2.49 136,764 3405 -1.91 59,507
OTHER (SUBSIDIES AND BILLS DISCOUNTING) 3.25 47,364 1539 3.22 31,742 1022 -0.03 -15,622
b) LIABILITIES 1.69 922,271 17,314 1.15 951,788 13,192 -0.54 29,517
LIABILITIES TO BANKS 1.46 4367 64 1.09 2573 28 -0.37 -1,794
LIABILITIES TO CUSTOMERS 1.25 417,912 5214 0.84 444,736 3732 -0.41 26,824
REPO TO CUSTOMERS 1.95 3020 59 0.99 1993 20 -0.95 -1027
DEBT LIKE INSTRUMENTS 2.43 471,942 11,463 1.88 486,378 9163 -0.55 14,436
CERTIFICATES OF DEPOSIT 2.11 23,782 502 1.59 15,356 245 -0.52 -8426
OTHER (UNPAID EXPIRED LIABILITIES) 0.94 1248 12 0.50 752 4 -0.44 -496
Interest Rate Spread and IM (a-b) 2.03 24,020 2.09 23,035 0.06
Notes: thousands of Euro unless otherwise indicated; r (%) = interest rate; IT = amount of the nth position; 
I = interest income (expense). Δr = variation in the interest rate 2010-2009. ΔIT = variation in the amount 
of the  nth position 2010-2009. ΔI = variation in the interest 2010-2009. Figures may not add up due to 
rounding.
Source: own elaboration with balance sheet data.
Table 5: Interest Margin (IM) by item (for the same interest rates), 2009-2010
ITEMS 2009 2010 Δr (%) IT I r (%) IT I ΔIT
a) ASSETS 3.72 977,949 41,334 3.72 978,238 40,775 290
LOANS AND RECEIVABLES WITH BANKS 1.08 10,917 118 1.08 22,653 246 11,736
DEMAND AND REVOCABLE 5.16 254,551 13,127 5.16 209,181 10,787 -45,370
MORTGAGES 3.78 481,885 18,225 3.78 481,189 18,199 -696
UNSECURED LOANS 4.65 105,975 4926 4.65 96,709 4495 -9266
SECURITIES 4.40 77,257 3399 4.40 136,764 6016 59,507
OTHER (SUBSIDIES AND BILLS DISCOUNTING) 3.25 47,364 1539 3.25 31,742 1032 -15,622
b) LIABILITIES 1.69 922,271 17,314 1.69 951,788 17,771 29,517
LIABILITIES TO BANKS 1.46 4367 64 1.46 2573 38 -1794
LIABILITIES TO CUSTOMERS 1.25 417,912 5214 1.25 444,736 5549 26,824
REPO TO CUSTOMERS 1.95 3020 59 1.95 1993 39 -1027
DEBT LIKE INSTRUMENTS 2.43 471,942 11,463 2.43 486,378 11,814 14,436
CERTIFICATES OF DEPOSIT 2.11 23,782 502 2.11 15,356 324 -8426
OTHER (UNPAID EXPIRED LIABILITIES) 0.94 1248 12 0.94 752 7 -496
Interest Rate Spread and IM (a-b) 2.03 24,020 2.03 23,004
Notes: in thousands of Euro unless otherwise indicated; r (%) = interest rate; IT = amount of the  nth 
position; I = interest income (expense). ΔIT = variation in the amount of the nth position 2010-2009. ΔI = 
variation in the interest 2010-2009.
Source: own elaboration with balance sheet data.
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Table 6: Interest Margin (IM) by item (with the same interest rates, except for “securities”) 2009-2010
ITEMS 2009 2010 Δr (%) IT I r (%) IT I ΔIT
a) ASSETS 3.72 977,949 41,334 3.43 978,238 38,419 291
LOANS AND RECEIVABLES WITH BANKS 1.08 10,917 118 1.08 22,653 246 11’736
DEMAND AND REVOCABLE 5.16 254,551 13’127 5.16 209,181 10,787 -45,370
MORTGAGES 3.78 481,885 18,225 3.78 481,189 18,199 -696
UNSECURED LOANS 4.65 105,975 4926 4.65 96,709 4495 -9266
SECURITIES 4.40 77,257 3399 2.68 136,764 3661 59,507
OTHER (SUBSIDIES AND BILLS DISCOUNTING) 3.25 47,364 1539 3.25 31,742 1032 -15,622
b) LIABILITIES 1.69 922,271 17,314 1.69 951,788 17,771 29,518
LIABILITIES TO BANKS 1.46 4367 64 1.46 2573 38 -1794
LIABILITIES TO CUSTOMERS 1.25 417,912 5214 1.25 444,736 5549 26,824
REPO TO CUSTOMERS 1.95 3020 59 1.95 1993 39 -1027
DEBT LIKE INSTRUMENTS 2.43 471,942 11,463 2.43 486,378 11,814 14,436
CERTIFICATES OF DEPOSIT 2.11 23,782 502 2.11 15,356 324 -8426
OTHER (UNPAID EXPIRED LIABILITIES) 0.94 1248 12 0.94 752 7 -496
Interest Rate Spread and IM (a-b) 2.03 24,020 1.74 20,648
Notes: in thousands of Euro unless otherwise indicated; r (%) = interest rate; IT = amount of the  nth 
position; I = interest income (expense). ΔIT = variation in the amount of the nth position 2010-2009. ΔI = 
variation in the interest 2010-2009.
Source: own elaboration with balance sheet data.
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Table 7: Interest rate risk of the banking book (2009)
































revocable 283,875 464,500 -180,625 0.00 200 bp 0.00% - 0.00 -200 bp 0.00%
Up to 1 month 471,129 19,251 451,878 0.04 200 bp 0.08% 362 0.04 -200 bp -0.08%
From 1 to 3 
months 72,837 162,533 -89,696 0.16 200 bp 0.32% -287 0.16 -200 bp -0.32%
From 3 to 6 
months 74,435 199,495 -125,060 0.36 200 bp 0.72% -900 0.36 -200 bp -0.72%
From 6 to 12 
months 10,769 11,471 -702 0.71 200 bp 1.42% -10 0.71 -200 bp -1.42%
From 1 to 2 
years 13,907 19,319 -5412 1.38 200 bp 2.76% -149 1.38 -200 bp -2.76%
From 2 to 3 
years 10,617 64,417 -53,800 2.25 200 bp 4.50% -2421 2.25 -200 bp -4.50%
From 3 to 4 
years 10,395 859 9536 3.07 200 bp 6.14% 586 3.07 -200 bp -6.14%
From 4 to 5 
years 9943 12,166 -2,223 3.85 200 bp 7.70% -171 3.85 -200 bp -7.70%
From 5 to 7 
years 30,334 1707 28,627 5.08 200 bp 10.16% 2909 5.08 -200 bp -10.16%
From 7 to 10 
years 12,942 2664 10,278 6.63 200 bp 13.26% 1363 6.63 -200 bp -13.26%
From 10 to 15 
years 19,043 3429 15,614 8.92 200 bp 17.84% 2786 8.92 -200 bp -17.84%
From 15 to 20 
years 12,030 1440 10,590 11.21 200 bp 22.42% 2374 11.21 -200 bp -22.42%
Over 20 years 4981 281 4700 13.01 200 bp 26.02% 1223 13.01 -200 bp -26.02%
TOTAL 1,037,237 963,532 73,705 7662
Total Interest Rate Risk Exposure (IRRE) =  7662
Regulatory Capital (RC) = 102,739
Interest Rate Risk Indicator (IRRI) = IRRE/RC = 7.46%
Note: in thousands of Euro unless otherwise indicated.
Source: own elaboration with balance sheet data.
Table 8: Interest rate risk of the banking book (2010)














(a) • (b) Weighted exposures









Demand and revocable 254,239 267,025 -12,786 0.00 200 bp 0.00% 0 0.00 -200 bp 0.00%
Up to 1 month 451,112 37,194 413,918 0.04 200 bp 0.08% 331 0.04 -200 bp -0.08%
From 1 to 3 months 88,377 166,742 -78,365 0.16 200 bp 0.32% -251 0.16 -200 bp -0.32%
From 3 to 6 months 139,365 123,712 15,653 0.36 200 bp 0.72% 113 0.36 -200 bp -0.72%
From 6 to 12 months 24,208 68,741 -44,533 0.71 200 bp 1.42% -632 0.71 -200 bp -1.42%
From 1 to 2 years 33,758 139,145 -105,387 1.38 200 bp 2.76% -2909 1.38 -200 bp -2.76%
From 2 to 3 years 26,428 90,259 -63,831 2.25 200 bp 4.50% -2872 2.25 -200 bp -4.50%
From 3 to 4 years 12,106 73,140 -61,034 3.07 200 bp 6.14% -3747 3.07 -200 bp -6.14%
From 4 to 5 years 5326 54,320 -48,994 3.85 200 bp 7.70% -3773 3.85 -200 bp -7.70%
From 5 to 7 years 7830 1764 6066 5.08 200 bp 10.16% 616 5.08 -200 bp -10.16%
From 7 to 10 years 16,824 2664 14,160 6.63 200 bp 13.26% 1878 6.63 -200 bp -13.26%
From 10 to 15 years 14,946 3115 11,831 8.92 200 bp 17.84% 2111 8.92 -200 bp -17.84%
From 15 to 20 years 8227 955 7272 11.21 200 bp 22.42% 1630 11.21 -200 bp -22.42%
Over 20 years 5257 159 5098 13.01 200 bp 26.02% 1326 13.01 -200 bp -26.02%
TOTAL 1,088,003 1,028,935 59,068 -6179
Total Interest Rate Risk Exposure (IRRE) = 6179
Regulatory Capital (RC) = 101,072
Interest Rate Risk Indicator (IRRI) = IRRE/RC =   6.11%
Note: in thousands of Euro unless otherwise indicated.
Source: own elaboration with balance sheet data.
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Table 9: Changes on the interest rate risk in the banking book (2009-2010)
2009 2010 Δ(%)
Total Interest Rate Risk Exposure (IRRE) 7662 6179 -19.4
Regulatory Capital (RC) 102,739 101,072 -1.6
Interest Rate Risk Indicator (IRRI) = IRRE/RC (%) 7.46 6.11
Note: in thousands of Euro unless otherwise indicated.
Source: own elaboration with balance sheet data.
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Up to 1 
month
1 to 3 
months
3 to 6 
months
6 to 12 
months
1 to 2 
years
2 to 3 
years
3 to 4 
years
4 to 5 
years
5 to 7 
years












Assets -27,582 -19,422 -8002 65,044 13,599 18,313 15,501 1684 -4634 -22,534 3826 -4164 -3828 275 28,076
Assets like instruments
Fixed rate bonds (with 
prepayment option) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fixed rate bonds (other) 0 -14 -14,860 -10,033 54 0 10 -11 0 15 6303 0 -2 2456 -16,082
Floating rate bonds 4457 0 6447 59,510 -2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 70,412
Loans to customers
Current accounts (fixed rate) -2627 0 0 18 941 1579 2848 238 0 -1579 0 0 0 0 1418
Fixed rate loans (with 
prepayment option) 571 -1904 -664 -554 -785 -1076 -1050 -699 -470 -1111 -763 -1766 -2369 -1683 -14,323
Other loans (fixed rate) 1346 -291 251 -211 6735 8294 11,304 -452 -663 -7371 -1714 -2390 -1457 -498 12,883
Current accounts (floating 
rate) -27,558 0 0 253 3142 3849 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -20,314
Other loans (floating rate) -18,437 -17,060 2911 16,045 3514 5667 2389 2608 -3501 -12,488 0 -8 0 0 -18,360
Loans to banks
Fixed rate loans 14,741 -625 -1458 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12,674
Floating rate loans -75 -581 -629 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1285
Reserve base 0 1053 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1053
Liabilities -197,535 14,786 -18,972 -75,309 58,760 120,549 25,943 72,330 42,160 0 0 0 0 0 42,712
Liabilities like instruments Fixed rate bonds (with 
prepayment option) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fixed rate bonds (other) -10 -2236 -5998 -4689 17,817 70,191 -23,906 22,481 -7689 0 0 0 0 0 65,961
32
Floating rate bonds -89,462 12,637 -25,322 -83,968 16,019 498 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -169,598
Deposits to customer accounts
Current accounts and deposits 
(fixed rate) -1207 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1207
Fixed rate deposits (other, 
with prepayment option) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fixed rate deposits (other) 751 0 1115 877 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2743
Current accounts and deposits 
(floating rate) -226,647 4154 8308 12,462 24,924 49,849 49,849 49,849 49,849 0 0 0 0 0 22,597
Floating rate deposits (other) 141,022 0 2653 9 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 143,695
Deposits by banks
Fixed rate deposits -25 231 272 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 478
Floating rate deposits -22,046 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -22,046
Other liabilities Fixed and floating rate liabilities 89 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 89
Off-balance sheet items -2114 -3752 361 360 1330 2,261 411 76 23 -27 56 381 510 123 -1
Net exposures 2009 -180,625 451,878 -89,696 -125,060 -702 -5412 -53,800 9536 2223 28,627 10,278 15,614 10,590 4700 73,705
Net exposures 2010 -12,786 413,918 -78,365 15,653 -44,533 -105,387 -63,831 -61,034 -48,994 6066 14,160 11,831 7272 5098 59,068
Δ Net exposures 2010-2009 167,839 -37,960 11,331 140,713 -43,831 -99,975 -10,031 -70,570 -46,771 -22,561 3882 -3783 -3318 398 -14,637
Weighting factors (±%) 0.00 0.08 0.32 0.72 1.42 2.76 4.50 6.14 7.70 10.16 13.26 17.84 22.42 26.02
Δ Net weighted exposure for each time band 0 -693 538 788 642 3058 5293 3162 3944 -3525 -3240 -4896 -4005 -2549 -1483
Note: in thousands of Euro unless otherwise indicated.
Source: own elaboration with balance sheet data.
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